Main economic indicators of Ukraine and the world at the start of 2026

The article presents the key macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine and the global economy as of the end of December 2025. The analysis is based on up-to-date data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU), the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and leading national statistical agencies (Eurostat, BEA, NBS, ONS, TurkStat, IBGE). Maksym Urakin, Director for Development and Marketing at Interfax-Ukraine, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy in History, and founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center, presented an overview of the current macroeconomic trends that shaped the situation in Ukraine and the world at the beginning of 2026.

Macroeconomic indicators of Ukraine

By the end of January 2026, the Ukrainian economy had entered the new year with a combination of two opposing trends: on the one hand, a gradual easing of inflationary pressure, a record level of international reserves, and a continued controlled situation on the foreign exchange market; on the other, war risks, the budget's heavy dependence on external financing, weak exports, and a structural shortage of foreign currency in the private sector.

According to the NBU's estimate, Ukraine's real GDP grew by 1.8% in 2025. This meant the economy maintained positive momentum for the third year in a row, although the pace of recovery remained moderate. The NBU attributed this performance to resilient domestic demand, a loose fiscal policy, the adaptability of businesses, and measures to maintain macro-financial stability. At the same time, physical export volumes declined because of low stocks of agricultural products, weak external demand for products of the mining and metallurgical complex, and restrictions linked to electricity shortages at the end of the year.

In January 2026, the disinflationary trend continued. According to SSSU data commented on by the NBU, consumer inflation slowed to 7.4% year on year, while prices rose by 0.7% month on month. Core inflation also declined, to 7.0% y/y. The NBU linked this trend to smaller imbalances in the labor market, the secondary effects of the high harvests of 2025, competition from certain imported products, and a controlled situation on the foreign exchange market. At the same time, the regulator noted the first signs of increasing pressure from unprocessed food.

In the view of Maksym Urakin, January 2026 became an important test for the Ukrainian economy after the end of a difficult 2025. The decline in inflation to 7.4% showed that tight monetary conditions, the stabilization of the foreign exchange market, and an improved supply of food products had produced results. But, in his assessment, this result should not be interpreted as a full normalization.

“At the beginning of 2026, Ukraine achieved a combination that is rare for a wartime economy: inflation was declining, the foreign exchange market remained under control, reserves set a new historical high, and the economy did not lose its positive momentum. However, this does not mean the country has moved into a classic recovery phase. What we have is rather a stabilization regime, in which many indicators look better thanks to external financing, budget spending, business adaptation, and the NBU's policy. If international aid were removed from this construction, or if a new severe energy or currency shock were allowed to occur, the resilience of the system would again be in serious question,” Urakin noted.

The NBU's January decision on the key policy rate became one of the key signals at the start of the year. On January 29, 2026, the National Bank announced the start of a cycle of monetary easing and a cut in the key policy rate from 15.5% to 15.0%, effective January 30. The regulator explained this by the steady decline in inflationary pressure and the reduced risks associated with external financing. At the same time, the NBU stressed that inflation expectations remained relatively high and that inflation was expected to return to the 5% target only over the policy horizon.

This decision did not mean a shift to a loose monetary policy in the full sense. The real yield on hryvnia instruments remained positive, and the continued interest in hryvnia assets was one of the important factors restraining demand for foreign currency. In its January Inflation Report, the NBU noted that keeping the rate high in previous months had supported demand for hryvnia assets, and that households' investments in domestic government bonds (OVDP) and deposits in the national currency continued to grow.

“Cutting the key policy rate to 15% was a cautious and logical step, but it cannot be taken as a signal that money will quickly become cheaper. Ukraine remains in conditions of war, high budget needs, and a significant foreign currency deficit in the private sector. Therefore the NBU is in effect trying to walk through a very narrow corridor: on the one hand, not to stifle economic activity with money that is too expensive, and on the other, not to lose control over inflation expectations and the foreign exchange market. In such a situation, every rate cut must be not a political gesture but the result of a real easing of risks,” Urakin stressed.

The external sector remained the main pillar of Ukraine's macro-financial resilience. At the end of January 2026, Ukraine's international reserves rose to $57.7 billion, setting a new historical high. The NBU attributed the increase in reserves to inflows of external financing, which largely offset the National Bank's net sales of foreign currency and the country's debt payments in foreign currency.

In its January Inflation Report, the NBU also recorded that in 2025 Ukraine received $52.4 billion in international financial support, including $32.7 billion from the EU, $12.0 billion from the US, and $3.4 billion from Canada. At the beginning of 2026, reserves stood at $57.3 billion, equivalent to 5.8 months of future imports, and the NBU's forecast envisaged an increase in international reserves to $65 billion at the end of 2026 and to $71 billion at the end of 2028.

At the same time, foreign trade remained a weak spot. According to customs data, Ukraine's trade turnover in January 2026 amounted to $9.9 billion: imports of $6.7 billion and exports of $3.2 billion. This meant that the trade deficit remained high, and domestic demand for imports continued to exceed foreign currency export earnings significantly.

“Record reserves are a strong stabilizing factor, but they should not create an illusion of self-sufficiency. Ukraine's balance of payments continues to rest largely on external aid rather than on the economy's export capacity. When imports are more than double exports in goods trade, it means the country is financing a significant part of current consumption and war needs with external resources. This is justified in wartime, but strategically such a model cannot be permanent. In 2026, the key task must be to expand its own foreign currency base through exports, processing, energy resilience, and investment in production,” Urakin stressed.

The budget situation at the beginning of 2026 also remained relatively controlled but structurally strained. According to aggregated budget execution data, in January 2026 state budget revenues amounted to about UAH 303.8 billion and expenditures to about UAH 286.2 billion. This monthly picture did not remove the overall problem of the year: public finances remained dependent on the regularity of external financing, on domestic borrowing, and on the government's ability to maintain confidence in hryvnia instruments.

Global economy

At the end of January 2026, the global economy looked more resilient than expected at the end of 2025, but this resilience was uneven. In its January update of the World Economic Outlook, the IMF forecast global economic growth of 3.3% in 2026 and 3.2% in 2027. The Fund attributed this to investment in technology, fiscal and monetary support, more favorable financial conditions, and the adaptability of the private sector. At the same time, the IMF warned of risks associated with a reassessment of expectations for the technology sector and a possible escalation of geopolitical tensions.

In the US, the economy maintained positive momentum, but the pace slowed at the end of 2025. According to the BEA's preliminary estimate, US real GDP grew by 1.4% year on year in the fourth quarter of 2025 after a stronger third quarter, and by 2.2% for 2025 as a whole. Growth was driven by consumer spending and investment, while exports and government spending held back the result. Inflation in the US remained moderately above target: the consumer price index rose by 2.7% from December 2024 to December 2025, and core CPI by 2.6%. On January 28, 2026, the Federal Reserve kept the target range for the federal funds rate at 3.5–3.75%.

The eurozone approached the start of 2026 with inflation close to target but weak economic momentum. According to Eurostat's estimate, annual inflation in the eurozone in December 2025 was 2.0%, down from 2.1% in November. The highest component remained services inflation at 3.4%, while the energy component was negative. The ECB's rates at the beginning of 2026 remained at the levels set in 2025: the deposit facility rate at 2.0%, the main refinancing operations rate at 2.15%, and the marginal lending facility rate at 2.40%.

The United Kingdom remained one of Europe's most contradictory major economies. According to the ONS, the UK's GDP grew by 1.3% in 2025, partly thanks to the services sector. However, inflation accelerated to 3.4% year on year in December 2025, which remained noticeably above the Bank of England's target. In December 2025, the Bank of England cut its base rate to 3.75%, but the decision was taken by a narrow 5–4 majority, indicating persistent disagreement within the regulator about the pace of further easing.

“The global economy at the beginning of 2026 did not look crisis-ridden, but it cannot be called uniformly strong. The US maintained positive momentum, though no longer at an overheated pace; the eurozone was in effect balancing between low inflation and weak growth; the UK had slow growth but a still elevated inflation backdrop. This means for Ukraine that external demand is unlikely to become a powerful independent driver of recovery. The global environment rather creates moderately favorable financial conditions but does not guarantee an automatic increase in Ukrainian exports,” noted Maksym Urakin.

China ended 2025 with a formally strong result. According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the country's GDP grew by 5.0% in 2025, to 140.1879 trillion yuan. The primary sector grew by 3.9%, the secondary sector by 4.5%, and the tertiary sector by 5.4%. At the same time, the inflation picture remained weak: in December 2025, CPI rose by only 0.8% year on year, and core inflation by 1.2%. This indicated that the Chinese economy retained its production and export strength, but domestic consumer demand remained insufficiently strong.

India, by contrast, remained the main growth driver among the large economies. According to the government's first advance estimate, India's real GDP in the 2025/26 fiscal year was to grow by 7.4% after 6.5% in the 2024/25 fiscal year. Nominal GDP was estimated to grow by 8.0%, and the main driver of real GVA was the services sector. At the same time, inflation remained very low: in December 2025, CPI was 1.33% year on year, and food inflation was negative.

At the beginning of 2026, Turkey remained an example of an economy with relatively high growth but a difficult inflation legacy. According to TurkStat, inflation in December 2025 was 30.89% year on year, and in January 2026 it was 30.65%. Later official materials from Turkey's Ministry of Trade showed that the country's economy grew by 3.6% in 2025 and by 3.4% y/y in the fourth quarter.

Brazil ended 2025 on a modestly positive note. According to IBGE, IPCA inflation in 2025 was 4.26%, and the December monthly figure was 0.33%. Brazil's GDP grew by 2.3% in 2025, to 12.7 trillion reais at current prices. Growth was seen in all three main sectors: agriculture, industry, and services.

“China, India, Turkey, and Brazil show very well how different the dynamics of the large emerging economies have become. China has large scale and a strong production base, but still a weak price impulse. India demonstrates the most convincing combination of high growth and low inflation. Turkey maintains momentum, but the price of this growth is a very high inflation backdrop. Brazil moves more moderately, but in a more balanced way. It is important for Ukraine to look at these examples not in the abstract but in practical terms: in global competition, the winners are those economies that are able to maintain macro stability, a production base, exports, and domestic investment demand at the same time,” Urakin believes.

Conclusions

As of the end of January 2026, Ukraine was in a regime of managed macro-financial stabilization. Inflation was falling, the key policy rate had been cautiously reduced to 15%, international reserves had set a new historical high, and the economy maintained positive growth after the end of 2025. At the same time, this stability remained dependent on three key conditions: regular external financing, a controlled situation on the foreign exchange market, and the state's ability to sustain domestic demand without triggering a new wave of inflation.

The main risks for Ukraine at the beginning of 2026 remained war losses, a shortage of energy infrastructure, weak exports, high budget needs, dependence on international aid, and a structural labor shortage. A positive factor was that the NBU had a record stock of reserves and room for a cautious easing of policy. A negative one was that the real production and export base was not yet generating enough domestic resources for an independent recovery.

The global economy at the same moment was not in a phase of deep crisis. The IMF forecast global growth of 3.3% in 2026, the US remained resilient, the eurozone stayed close to its inflation target, India demonstrated high growth rates, and China remained a large but structurally ambiguous source of global demand. At the same time, none of these external factors guaranteed Ukraine a rapid recovery without domestic decisions.

“January 2026 showed that Ukraine is entering the new year not from a position of economic breakthrough, but from a position of preserved manageability. This is important, because in wartime the very ability to control inflation, the exchange rate, budget needs, and reserves is already a significant result. But the next stage will be harder: the country needs to move from a model of survival and stabilization to a model of productive recovery. This means investment in energy, the defense-industrial complex, processing, logistics, export production, human capital, and technology. Without this, even record reserves and external aid will remain only a financial cushion, not a source of long-term growth,” concluded Maksym Urakin.

The monthly analytical and statistical product “Economic Monitoring” is available to clients of Interfax-Ukraine.

Head of the “Economic Monitoring” project, Director for Development and Marketing at Interfax-Ukraine, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy in History, and founder of the Experts Club information and analytical center Maksym Urakin